# Manifesto ### The cryptoeconomy needs credit expansion. The modern financial system runs on two pillars: a medium of exchange, and the creation of credit — the ability to borrow against creditworthiness and future cash flows, not just existing assets. Stablecoins delivered the first pillar over the past decade. The second is still missing. To become the internet-native financial system, DeFi has to stand on three kinds of credit: crypto-backed, algo-backed, and future-backed. Overcollateralized protocols like Aave and Morpho scaled the first. Prime brokers, exchanges, and synthetic-dollar protocols productized the second. Credit against repayment capacity, receivables, income, and cash flows — the largest category in traditional finance — is the one DeFi never built. U.S. unsecured consumer credit alone is roughly $1.6T outstanding, and fintech-originated consumer and SMB receivables sit within a $5T+ asset-based-finance category. 3Jane exists to build that third pillar — and the most direct path to it runs through the lenders who already serve the real economy. ### Fintechs made origination software. Capital markets stayed legacy. Since the 2010s, fintech lenders — Affirm, Figure, SoFi, and hundreds of smaller originators — rebuilt borrowing as software: acquire borrowers, underwrite, and service repayments through an API, compressing a multi-week branch process into an instant call. But the capital-markets side never modernized. Lenders still scale on outside capital the old way — underwrite and originate, finance or sell the loans to outside investors, retain the origination economics, repeat. That funding journey is a ladder — bank warehouse, forward-flow, unrated ABS, rated ABS — and each rung is cheaper than the last. As a lender's book grows it qualifies for better terms, which lets it grow faster: an originate-to-distribute flywheel that turns balance-sheet-heavy lending into capital-light platform economics. Many originators reach a warehouse. Far fewer reach durable forward-flow. Almost no small-business or specialty lender reaches ABS — not because the assets fail, but because they are too small, too bespoke, or too short-duration to build the full securitization stack. The result is a permanent middle market: good credit businesses capped by bilateral facilities, trapped equity, and renewal risk, with capital-markets infrastructure that never compounds. ### Fintech Credit Conduits. 3Jane is structured credit as software. **Fintech Credit Conduits (FCCs)** are standing, revolving, tranched funding rails — warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flow agreements — that finance short-duration SMB and consumer receivables originated by U.S. fintech lenders. They are funded by one onchain capital stack — **USD3** (senior) and **sUSD3** (junior, first-loss) — and route every dollar through bankruptcy-remote SPVs, so supplier exposure is to thousands of underlying obligors rather than to any single originator. The insight is simple: forward-flow-style purchase rails plus a standing, revolving, tranched conduit equal private-ABS economics — delivered to originators years before they could build a securitization program themselves. The conduit spreads fixed structuring overhead across a platform instead of a single lender, replaces one warehouse provider's mandate and balance sheet with diversified stablecoin capital, and makes issuance, settlement, and distribution programmable. It compresses the warehouse → forward-flow → unrated-ABS path into one primitive that runs continuously. ### One capital stack, the whole economy. The same USD3 / sUSD3 stack also funds 3Jane's direct crypto credit lines — uncollateralized USDC extended to cryptonatives against verifiable proofs of onchain, offchain, and future assets. Running fintech conduits alongside direct credit diversifies the pool across duration, asset class, and counterparty, and channels onchain capital into both ends of the credit economy at once: the cryptonative borrowers DeFi was built for, and the fintech lenders reaching millions of American consumers and small businesses. This is what it takes to become a truly internet-native financial system — one that creates credit as software, free from bank liquidity, and funds the real economy from onchain capital. The terminal state of internet capital markets, backed by future growth. # Introduction The Credit-Based Money Market 3Jane is a peer-to-pool, credit-based money market on Ethereum. Suppliers deposit USDC into a single tranched capital stack — **USD3** (senior) and **sUSD3** (junior, first-loss) — and that capital funds two credit sleeves in parallel: 1. **Crypto Credit Lines (CCL).** Uncollateralized USDC credit lines underwritten directly to U.S.-based cryptonatives against verifiable proofs of DeFi, CEX, and bank assets, future cash flows, and credit scores. 3Jane underwrites, originates, services, and holds these receivables itself. 2. **Fintech Credit Conduits (FCC).** Standing, tranched funding rails — warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flow agreements — that finance short-duration SMB and consumer receivables originated by other U.S. fintech lenders, through bankruptcy-remote SPVs. [USD3 and sUSD3](/usd3-susd3/suppliers) sit on the other end of both sleeves: USD3 earns a variable senior share of pool yield and is credit-enhanced, while sUSD3 earns the levered junior share and absorbs first losses, net recoveries. Both tranche rates float with what the backing generates. Running the two sleeves together diversifies the pool across duration, asset class, and counterparty.
One USD3/sUSD3 capital stack funding two credit sleeves

One tranched capital stack — USD3 senior, sUSD3 junior — funds two credit sleeves: crypto credit lines and fintech credit conduits.

Together, the two sleeves open up a three-dimensional collateral space in crypto financial markets — adding future-backed and cash-flow-backed credit alongside the asset-backed loans DeFi already knows. Underwriting blends onchain credit scoring from Cred Protocol and Blockchain Bureau with offchain VantageScore 3.0 scores attested via zkTLS, so credit risk can be priced at scale. Solvency is enforced onchain: non-performing debt is sold through auctions where licensed U.S. collections agencies bid for the right to recover it. The result is a single, capital-efficient credit primitive that reaches both cryptonative borrowers — sole proprietors, businesses, and AI agents — and the fintech lenders serving millions of American consumers and small businesses. ## Crypto Credit Lines The CCL sleeve extends instant capital across two cryptonative borrower segments: 1. greater capital-efficiency for asset-rich yield farmers and traders by leveraging their entire financial profile across DeFi assets, centralized exchanges, brokerage, and bank assets; 2. capital access for high-productivity, asset-light businesses and AI agents for working capital and growth financing, underwritten against their future cash flows. It runs on three protocol primitives: 1. [**Core money market**](/backing/ccl)**:** a two-sided market where suppliers deposit USDC to mint USD3 (and optionally stake for sUSD3), and merchants permissionlessly connect their ETH address, bank account via Plaid, and Credit Karma via zkTLS to generate a 0%-collateral, open-term, variable-rate USDC credit facility. 2. [**Credit underwriter**](/backing/ccl/credit-underwriter)**:** the 3Jane-operated offchain algorithm (3CA) that underwrites credit lines against verifiable DeFi, offchain, and future assets and on/offchain credit scores, deriving the credit-line amount, the default-risk-premium rate, and the repayment rate. 3. [**Credit slasher**](/backing/ccl/credit-slasher)**:** the solvency mechanism that deters defaults via Jane-score slashing, a pooled-upside model, and a non-performing-loan (NPL) auction that engages licensed U.S. collections agencies. ## Fintech Credit Conduits The FCC sleeve funds other fintech lenders rather than holding loans directly. Fintechs made loan origination software-native; 3Jane makes structured credit programmable — compressing the bank-warehouse → forward-flow → unrated-ABS path into one programmable conduit funded by USD3 / sUSD3. See [Fintech Credit Conduits](/backing/fcc) for mechanics, yield, credit enhancement, and legal structuring. # Suppliers Suppliers can permissionlessly deposit USDC to mint either **USD3** or **sUSD3**, and can also stake USD3 for sUSD3 (ERC-4626). The pool is risk-on: deposited capital is deployed into the two credit sleeves that [back](/backing/backing) it — [Fintech Credit Conduits](/backing/fcc) and [Crypto Credit Lines](/backing/ccl) — with idle cash held in Aave. USD3 and sUSD3 sit on the liability side as a senior / junior tranche pair over that backing. ## USD3 — senior tranche USD3 is the senior tranche. It earns native pool yield and sits ahead of sUSD3 in the waterfall: it is paid first and is the last to be impaired. USD3 is credit-enhanced — it sits behind originator first-loss equity, overcollateralization, reserves, performance triggers, and the sUSD3 junior tranche beneath it. USD3 yield is a **variable** share of pool interest that floats with what the backing generates (see [Pool Interest Rates](/usd3-susd3/pool-interest-rates)). USD3 can be redeemed up to the tranche ratio. ## sUSD3 — junior tranche sUSD3 is the junior, first-loss tranche. Staking USD3 for sUSD3 gives holders levered yield on the pool of credit while absorbing first losses (net recoveries) ahead of USD3. sUSD3: * earns the junior share of pool interest — higher yield, first to absorb losses; * has a **1-month lock** (still earning yield), then redeems via a cooldown and withdrawal window; * supply is capped by the tranche ratio (e.g. 15% of debt). ## Tranche ratio & waterfall The **tranche ratio** (`TRANCHE_RATIO`) caps subordination — the maximum share of debt that can be junior (sUSD3), e.g. 15%. The **tranche share variant** (`TRANCHE_SHARE_VARIANT`) sets how pool interest is split between the two tranches. Losses always hit sUSD3 before USD3. For the interest math across both sleeves, see [Pool Interest Rates](/usd3-susd3/pool-interest-rates). # Supply USDC
1. Go to 2. Enter amount of USDC you wish to supply 3. Click Deposit after connecting your wallet 4. You will receive [USD3](/usd3-susd3/suppliers) which you may choose to Stake and earn additional yield Note: 1. Minimum deposit of 1,000 USDC 2. Redemption conditions vary for USD3 and sUSD3 — see [FAQ](/resources/faq) for more 3. Any issues when depositing please reach out via [discord](/resources/links) # Pool Interest Rates ## Pool-Level APY Dynamics The aggregate variable rate earned by the pool is: $$ \text{IR}*{\text{Pool}} \= W*{\text{Aave}};\text{IR}\_{\text{SOFR}} * \sum\_{n=1}^{N} W\_{n},\text{IR}\_{n} $$ where $$ \begin{aligned} W\_{\text{Aave}} &: \text{ idle liquidity in Aave (earns }\text{IR}*{\text{SOFR}}\text{)} \\\[2pt] W*{n} &: \text{ weight of position }n \text{ (a credit line or facility)} \\ &: \bigl(\sum\_{n} W\_{n}=1-W\_{\text{Aave}}\bigr) \end{aligned} $$ Whatever the pool earns is then split between the senior (USD3) and junior (sUSD3) tranches. ## USD3 and sUSD3 APY In traditional tranching, the senior earns a **fixed** coupon and the junior takes the residual — the junior absorbs all the variance to keep the senior's rate constant. 3Jane works differently. A single **tranche share variant** (`TRANCHE_SHARE_VARIANT`), denoted `s`, splits pool interest in fixed proportions, so **both** tranches earn a variable rate that floats with what the backing generates: $$ \text{IR}*{\text{USD3}} \= \frac{(1-s),\text{IR}*{\text{Pool}}}{W\_{\text{USD3}}}, \qquad \text{IR}*{\text{sUSD3}} \= \frac{s,\text{IR}*{\text{Pool}}}{W\_{\text{sUSD3}}} $$ $$ \begin{aligned} s &: \text{tranche share variant — the junior's fixed fraction of pool interest} \\\[2pt] W\_{\text{USD3}}, W\_{\text{sUSD3}} &: \text{capital weights of each tranche } (W\_{\text{USD3}}+W\_{\text{sUSD3}}=1) \\\[2pt] \end{aligned} $$ The junior receives the fraction `s` of pool interest; the senior receives the remaining `1 − s`. Two consequences follow: * **The senior (USD3) coupon is variable.** Because USD3 takes a fixed *proportion* rather than a fixed *rate*, its APY rises and falls with pool yield. There is no promised fixed rate to defend. * **The junior (sUSD3) is more compelling.** The junior never has to give up part of its share to top a fixed senior coupon back up to target. It keeps its full slice of upside when the pool earns more — and, as first-loss capital, bears the downside when the pool earns less or takes losses. USD3 can be redeemed up to the tranche ratio, and remains senior in the waterfall: losses hit sUSD3 before USD3. ### Example Take a pool generating **13%**, with capital weights **85% USD3 / 15% sUSD3** and a tranche share variant of **`s = 0.30`** (30% of pool interest to the junior, 70% to the senior): | Pool yield | → sUSD3 (junior, s = 0.30) | → USD3 (senior, 1 − s = 0.70) | | ---------- | ------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------- | | 13% | 30% × 13% over 15% of capital → ≈ **26.0%** | 70% × 13% over 85% of capital → ≈ **10.7%** | | 15% | 30% × 15% over 15% of capital → ≈ **30.0%** | 70% × 15% over 85% of capital → ≈ **12.4%** | The split percentages are fixed; the resulting APYs move with the pool. 3Jane is not promising the senior any particular rate — when the backing generates more, both tranches earn more, and when it generates less, both earn less. *Figures are illustrative; the tranche share variant and pool yield are parameters that change over time.* # Liquidity USD3 and sUSD3 fund credit assets that are longer-dated than instant redemption, while suppliers can request redemptions sooner. This page sets out that liquidity profile and the tools that manage it. ## Redemption * **USD3** redeems up to the tranche ratio. * **sUSD3** has a 1-month lock, then a cooldown and withdrawal window. See [Suppliers](/usd3-susd3/suppliers) for the full tranche mechanics. ## Liquidity tools * **Cash buffer.** Idle USDC is held in Aave and is instantly available for redemptions. * **Self-liquidating assets.** The underlying receivables are short-duration — principal and interest return continuously as loans amortize, steadily refilling available cash. * **Secondary markets.** USD3 / sUSD3 can be traded to exit ahead of primary redemption. * **Committed liquidity facilities (roadmap).** On-demand liquidity facilities — the role liquidity enhancement plays in a traditional ABCP conduit — layered on top of the cash buffer and secondary markets. The cash buffer introduces some yield drag, which $JANE incentives are sized to offset. # Overview The [USD3 / sUSD3](/usd3-susd3/suppliers) capital stack is backed by two credit sleeves running in parallel, plus an idle reserve: * [**Fintech Credit Conduits (FCC)**](/backing/fcc) — standing, tranched funding rails (warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flow agreements) that finance short-duration SMB and consumer receivables originated by other U.S. fintech lenders, through bankruptcy-remote SPVs. This is the pool's primary backing. * [**Crypto Credit Lines (CCL)**](/backing/ccl) — uncollateralized USDC credit lines 3Jane underwrites, originates, services, and holds directly for U.S.-based cryptonatives, against verifiable proofs of assets, cash flows, and credit scores. Running the two sleeves together diversifies the pool across duration, asset class, and counterparty. ## Total Value Verified (TVV) **Total Value Verified (TVV)** measures every verifiable dollar that stands behind the pool's deployed credit. It rebalances automatically as utilization changes and as capital moves between the two sleeves. At any moment, pool capital sits in one of the following states: 1. **Crypto money markets (idle).** Idle USDC is supplied to the Aave V3 USDC market, streaming a base yield and remaining instantly available. When a [merchant](/backing/ccl/merchants) draws a credit line or an [FCC facility](/backing/fcc/facilities) is funded, the required amount is withdrawn from Aave and deployed — then refilled as repayments arrive. 1. Yield source: Aave's USDC supply rate (≈ SOFR). 2. Backing: Aave's multi-asset collateral set (ETH, stETH, major stables, etc.). 2. **Fintech facilities.** Capital deployed into [FCC](/backing/fcc) warehouse loans and forward-flow programs through bankruptcy-remote SPVs. 1. Yield source: the net spread on the underlying receivables after originator economics and expected losses. 2. Backing: for warehouse facilities, the net (post-haircut) value of eligible receivables securing 3Jane's senior position, plus originator first-loss equity; for forward-flow programs, the purchased loans' principal and accrued interest. See [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution). 3. **Crypto credit lines (on credit).** Capital deployed into direct [CCL](/backing/ccl) credit lines, priced by 3CA. Credit limits rely on asset proofs across DeFi wallets, CEX balances, bank accounts, and brokerages. 1. Yield source: Aave base rate + utilization spread + the 3CA default-risk premium. 2. Backing: verifiable on-chain and off-chain assets and cash-flows tied to each merchant, enforced by the credit-slashing and collections infrastructure. 4. **Staging.** Capital raised and off-ramped through [Erebor](/backing/fcc/banking-rail-erebor) but not yet wired into a facility — committed, transitional, and held 1:1 in cash. Once a wire clears and the servicer report updates, staged capital moves into deployed facility principal. Live pool composition, backing percentage, and per-sleeve breakdowns are published on the [backing page](https://app.3jane.xyz/info/backing). # Fintech Credit Conduits (FCC) Standing, tranched funding rails for U.S. fintech lenders, financed through USD3 / sUSD3. Fintech Credit Conduits (FCCs) are one of the two credit sleeves that [back](/backing/backing) USD3 / sUSD3. They are standing, revolving, tranched funding rails — **warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flow agreements** — that finance short-duration SMB and consumer credit originated by other U.S. fintech lenders, routed through bankruptcy-remote SPVs that insulate the collateral from the originator and from 3Jane's sponsor entity. Fintechs made loan *origination* software-native. 3Jane is making *structured credit* programmable. ## The opportunity Fintech lenders scale on outside capital. They underwrite and originate loans, finance or sell them to outside investors, retain the origination economics, and repeat. As the book grows, lenders qualify for progressively cheaper funding channels: * **Bank warehouse** — a revolving credit line advanced against receivables, with the originator retaining a first-loss equity slice. * **Forward-flow** — whole-loan purchase agreements with asset managers and credit funds, subject to eligibility criteria. * **Unrated ABS** — a private term takeout with tranched liabilities. * **Rated ABS** — an agency-rated public securitization placed with institutional buyers.
The originate-to-distribute funding ladder

As a lender scales it converges on the originate-to-distribute (OTD) model — moving from balance-sheet-heavy growth to capital-light platform economics.

Many originators reach a warehouse, far fewer reach durable forward-flow, and almost no SMB fintech / specialty lenders reach ABS. This is a **structural bottleneck**: originators are too small, too bespoke, or too short-duration to build the full securitization stack — not because the assets fail. The result is a permanent middle market of good credit businesses capped by bilateral facilities, trapped equity, renewal risk, and capital-markets infrastructure that does not compound.
U.S. asset-based finance and alternative lending market size

Within the $5T+ ABF category, the U.S. alternative lending market — fintech-originated consumer and SMB receivables — is projected at $71.6B of annual loan disbursements in 2026, growing to $105.3B by 2029, fragmented across hundreds of originators. (Research and Markets, 2026; figure excludes credit cards, mortgages, and hard-asset lending.)

## What 3Jane bundles 3Jane packages the parts of private securitization that originators are too small to build and that incumbent credit funds have no incentive to productize: * **Financial-engineering advantage.** Tranching, standardization, and a standing conduit spread fixed securitization overhead across a platform rather than a single lender. Originators get private-ABS-style economics earlier. * **Capital-base advantage.** USD3 / sUSD3 is a repeatable senior / junior liability stack backed by diversified stablecoin capital — not one warehouse lender or forward-flow buyer with one mandate, one balance sheet, and one renewal cycle. * **Market-rails advantage.** Onchain liabilities make issuance, settlement, transfer, and distribution more flexible than bespoke private notes locked inside bilateral credit relationships. Over time USD3 / sUSD3 can plug into the rest of DeFi — collateral markets, vaults, liquidity venues, and settlement rails. {% hint style="info" %} FCCs are **not** corporate direct lending underwritten on a borrower's EBITDA. LP exposure is to thousands of the originator's underlying obligors rather than to the fintech itself. That diversification mitigates tail risk and makes losses far more modellable. See [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution). {% endhint %} ## Who 3Jane funds The initial FCC cohort targets fintech lenders with: * Pre-seed to Series C VC-backed, PE-backed, or bootstrapped balance sheets * $5m – $200m outstanding loan portfolio * Sub-12-month-duration assets * Asset classes: SMB term, lines of credit, merchant cash advance (MCA), BNPL, revenue-based finance (RBF), factoring, and select short-duration consumer installment loans and lines of credit ## In this section * [Warehouse Loans & Forward-Flows](/backing/fcc/warehouse-and-forward-flows) — the two facility structures, explained simply * [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution) — the protection layers and the risk we are paid for * [Legal Structuring](/backing/fcc/legal-structuring) — bankruptcy-remote SPVs, true-sale, DACA, and the waterfall * [Banking Rail (Erebor)](/backing/fcc/banking-rail-erebor) — the dollar leg of the protocol * [Facilities](/backing/fcc/facilities) — live facilities and how they are reported # Warehouse Loans & Forward-Flows 3Jane offers two facility structures. Both are the predominant forms of non-dilutive financing that banks and credit funds use to help fintech lenders scale their loan portfolios. Both have had little to no prior history in DeFi.
Warehouse loans and forward-flow programs

Two facility structures: warehouse loans (revolving credit against a pledged portfolio) and forward-flow programs (whole-loan purchases on a forward calendar).

* **Warehouse loans** — a revolving credit line advanced against the fintech lender's own pooled portfolio of loans, segregated in an SPV. 3Jane holds a senior secured position; the originator keeps the first-loss equity beneath it. * **Forward-flow programs** — whole-loan purchases of receivables that meet predefined eligibility criteria. 3Jane buys the loans outright into a purchaser SPV on a true-sale basis. ## ELI5: a warehouse loan A warehouse loan is the lowest-lift way for a fintech lender to scale its book without raising more equity.
Warehouse loan mechanic
Using a Klarna-style "burrito" example: 1. Klarna wants to fund a $4 burrito order on DoorDash. It has $1 of equity from a VC. 2. A lender (3Jane) advances Klarna $3 against the receivable, at a 75% advance rate. 3. Klarna funds the $4 order, pledges the receivable as collateral, and keeps the first-loss slice (the bottom $1). 4. The consumer repays Klarna in installments. Klarna repays the lender, who earns interest. Klarna earns the economics on $4 of loans while tying up only $1 of equity. 5. The same dollar of equity now funds 4x the loans. Repeat across millions of receivables. ## ELI5: a forward-flow A forward-flow is the next funding rail an originator graduates into once a warehouse can't scale fast enough.
Forward-flow mechanic
Continuing the burrito example: 1. Klarna has originated $4 of burrito loans, proved performance, and wants to scale to $10 of orders. 2. Doing that through a warehouse would require Klarna to raise more equity to fund the next first-loss slice — extremely dilutive. 3. A credit fund (3Jane) offers to buy the next $10 of receivables outright for $9.85 — a 1.5% purchase discount, whole-loan sale. The buyer earns a double-digit IRR off the embedded yield; Klarna gets capital that never touches its balance sheet. 4. Klarna originates the next batch, sells it on a forward calendar (e.g. weekly takedown), keeps the origination + servicing fee, and recycles all of its capital. ## It's the obligors paying, not the originator In both structures, the cash flows reaching the senior position are **contractual obligations from named end-borrowers** — the consumers and small businesses behind the receivables — not the operating cash flows of the originator itself. Cash flows are ring-fenced through SPV-level collateral mechanics: a warehouse is secured against eligible receivables held in an originator SPV, while a forward-flow purchases eligible receivables into the buyer SPV on a true-sale basis. See [Legal Structuring](/backing/fcc/legal-structuring). | | Warehouse loan | Forward-flow | | ------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | **3Jane's position** | Senior secured lender / noteholder | Owner of the purchased loans | | **Loan ownership** | Originator SPV holds receivables; 3Jane holds a perfected first-priority lien | Beneficial ownership transfers to the purchaser SPV at purchase (true-sale) | | **Key sizing metric** | Advance rate against the eligible borrowing base | Purchase discount / commitment | | **Originator skin-in-the-game** | First-loss equity beneath 3Jane | Origination & servicing fee; reps & warranties / repurchase | | **Capital recycling** | Revolving period, then amortization | Forward-calendar takedowns | Continue to [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution). # Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution This page maps the protection layers beneath USD3 and the loss distribution they sit on. Warehouse and forward-flow programs have had little prior history in DeFi, so their risks have rarely been mapped out in this context — this is that map. ## Layers of credit enhancement Cash flowing to USD3 sits behind a stack of protection that absorbs losses in order: 1. **Pool excess spread** — the net yield each vintage generates over its life, before any principal is impaired. 2. **Originator first-loss equity** — the originator's own capital beneath 3Jane (e.g. a 25% first-loss slice → 1.33x overcollateralization). 3. **Overcollateralization (OC)** — the eligible borrowing base exceeds the drawn balance; tested on a schedule (e.g. weekly). 4. **Reserves & performance triggers** — cash reserves and covenant triggers that trap cash or accelerate amortization if performance deteriorates. 5. **sUSD3 subordination** — the junior tranche absorbs losses before USD3 at the 3Jane capital-stack level. ## Why granularity matters
Loss distribution: single-name vs granular pool
* Single-name corporate credit is **bimodal**: most loans pay at par, but a default jumps to restructuring-level loss severity. * A granular SMB / consumer pool of \~3,000 obligors is **tight around expected loss**, because each obligor can fail independently. * Expected loss can be similar across the two; the *shape* — and therefore the risk we are paid for — is completely different.
N=30 vs N=3,000 loss distributions

Same expected loss, very different distributions. With 30 obligors, unexpected loss is wide and fat-tailed; with 3,000 obligors the distribution collapses to a tight spike and standard deviation falls by roughly two orders of magnitude.

At a 5% annual default probability and 50% LGD, expected pool loss is 2.5%. But the standard deviation of pool loss falls from \~2 percentage points at N=30 to \~0.2 percentage points at N=3,000. Diversification compresses idiosyncratic risk first; correlation risk is then handled at the structuring level.
OnDeck and Affirm ABS comparables

This is how the public ABS market routinely rates granular SMB and consumer receivables pools to investment grade. Sources: OnDeck Asset Securitization Trust IV, Series 2023-1 (KBRA, July 2023); Affirm Asset Securitization Trust 2024-B (DBRS Morningstar, September 2024).

## How structuring compresses the tail
Per-vintage capital stack

Capital stack on a per-vintage basis. Each cohort's net yield absorbs losses before any principal is impaired; the junior tranche absorbs anything beyond that; the senior takes losses only after both layers are exhausted. Markers show realised pool loss, the worst vintage in the book, and the senior break point.

On the receivables book 3Jane underwrites, cumulative charge-offs sit around **1%** of disbursed principal. The worst single vintage came in around **4.5%**, and seasoned vintages collectively run under 2%. A facility example with \~4% of yield cushion and a 15% junior tranche puts USD3 / senior first-dollar principal loss at roughly **19% cumulative pool loss per vintage**. ## Correlation: borrowers failing together
Correlation stress test
To model correlation risk, the structure was pressure-tested with a single-factor t-copula (ν = 10, fatter-tailed than Basel's standard Gaussian framework) at three intra-pool correlation regimes: ρ = 5% (benign), ρ = 15% (Basel's SMB base case), and ρ = 30% (GFC-equivalent correlated stress). The senior tranche holds up across the relevant range. The 99th-percentile pool loss — a once-a-century outcome — sits at **11.0%** (benign) and **14.5%** (moderate), well within the junior tranche. Even at GFC-equivalent correlation it reaches just **19.9%**, right at the senior break. The senior takes meaningful losses only in the 1-in-1,000 tail combined with GFC-equivalent correlated stress.
Pool loss to tranche P&L

Propagation from pool loss to tranche P&L, scenario by scenario. The senior is untouched until pool losses on a vintage cross ~19%; the junior is paid for absorbing everything in between.

{% hint style="warning" %} Target yields and loss figures are illustrative and based on the historically observed performance of the receivables book 3Jane underwrites. They are not guarantees — realised losses, correlation, and recoveries can differ. See [Risks](/risks) for protocol-wide risk factors. {% endhint %} # Legal Structuring Every FCC facility is built so that the assets funding USD3 / sUSD3 are ring-fenced from the originator's corporate credit and from 3Jane's own sponsor entity. ## Bankruptcy-remote SPVs Each facility funds a **bankruptcy-remote child SPV**. The SPV is insulated from the originator (so an originator bankruptcy does not sweep the collateral) and from 3Jane's sponsor entity. How 3Jane holds the assets depends on the structure: * **Warehouse.** The originator contributes or pledges eligible receivables into an SPV. 3Jane holds a **perfected first-priority security interest** / senior secured lender position against that collateral, and can sit in a **Senior** or **Mezzanine** tranche within the facility. The originator retains the first-loss equity beneath 3Jane. * **Forward-flow.** Eligible loans are **purchased** by the FCC child SPV, with beneficial ownership transferring at purchase on a **true-sale** basis, subject to the purchase documents and reps & warranties / repurchase mechanics. {% hint style="info" %} Two different tranche layers exist and shouldn't be confused. **Within a warehouse SPV**, 3Jane may sit in a Senior or Mezzanine tranche relative to the originator's equity. **Within the 3Jane pool**, [USD3 is senior and sUSD3 is junior](/usd3-susd3/suppliers) relative to each other. The first describes 3Jane's seniority inside a facility; the second describes LP seniority inside the protocol. {% endhint %} ## Collections control Borrower repayments land in a deposit account governed by a **Deposit Account Control Agreement (DACA)** — a tri-party agreement among the depository bank, the originator, and 3Jane that gives 3Jane control over the collection account so cash cannot be swept away from the facility. Collections are then applied through the facility **waterfall**: senior interest and principal owed to 3Jane are paid first, and residual economics flow back to the originator only after senior obligations are satisfied. ## Eligibility Eligibility is enforced at funding / purchase on two levels: * **Originator-level:** KYB, operating history, vintage performance, underwriting model, servicing capability, and reporting quality. * **Asset-level:** loan size, tenor, asset class, concentration caps, delinquency status, and obligor / merchant quality (plus consumer credit bands where relevant). ## Overcollateralization tests and haircuts Warehouse facilities run a recurring **OC / borrowing-base test** (e.g. weekly). Ineligible or delinquent collateral is **haircut** out of the borrowing base before the advance rate is applied — for example, receivables past a delinquency threshold, obligor concentration above a cap, or accounts in payment shortfall receive reduced or zero credit. If current OC falls toward the minimum, the facility moves from in-range to **watch** to **breached**, which can trap cash or trip a trigger. ## Facility lifecycle A facility moves through phases: 1. **Deploying / revolving.** During the revolving period, eligible principal collections are recycled into new advances or purchases. Because the loans are short-duration, the same committed dollar can turn over many times across diversified receivables. 2. **Amortization / wind-down.** After the revolving period ends, new advances stop; incoming collections pay down the senior balance and return capital through the USD3 / sUSD3 waterfall on an orderly schedule. Facility status is surfaced as **Active**, **Watch**, **Trigger Tripped**, or **Default**, with weekly surveillance. See [Facilities](/backing/fcc/facilities) for how this is reported. # Banking Rail (Erebor) FCCs settle in dollars: warehouse advances and whole-loan purchases wire out in USD, and repayments come back in USD. 3Jane runs that dollar leg through **Erebor**, an API-first, nationally chartered U.S. bank serving crypto-native businesses. Erebor's API lets 3Jane treat the entire dollar side of the protocol — offramp, disbursement, collection, onramp — as software, tightly integrated with stablecoin rails: the same auditability as the rest of the protocol, the same speed, and no human-in-the-loop for routine operations.
3Jane x Erebor flow of funds

USDC in, USD out to the originator, USD repayments back, yield onramped to USD3 / sUSD3.

## Flow of funds 1. **Staging offramps.** Capital deposited into 3Jane is converted from stablecoin to USD and parked in 3Jane's Erebor account. 2. **Funding facilities.** When an originator draws on a facility — a warehouse advance against new originations, a whole-loan purchase from a back-book sale, or a forward-flow takedown — the wire goes out from Erebor to the originator's account. 3. **Cash collection.** Interest on warehouse lines and principal-plus-interest on whole-loan purchases comes back into the same account via ACH or wire. 4. **Onramping yield.** Collected interest is converted back to stablecoins and distributed onchain to USD3 and sUSD3 holders. {% hint style="info" %} **Staging is a transitional state.** Capital that has been raised and off-ramped but not yet wired into a facility sits in Erebor "staging." It is already committed but not yet earning facility yield. As wires clear and servicer reports update, staged capital moves into deployed facility principal. 3Jane surfaces staged vs deployed capital on the [Backing](/backing/backing) page. {% endhint %} # Facilities 3Jane funds each originator through a discrete **facility** — either a warehouse loan or a forward-flow program. This page covers the first live facility and how facilities are reported. ## Live facility: LendSwift $10M senior warehouse
3Jane x LendSwift senior warehouse facility
3Jane executed a **$10M senior warehouse facility** with LendSwift, a U.S. fintech lender focused on short-duration consumer-installment loans. USD3 and sUSD3 fund the facility, which carries a 15% coupon and is backed by a diversified pool of \~15,000 consumer receivables with a \~4-month weighted-average term. | Term | Value | | ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Facility type | Senior warehouse | | Facility size | $10,000,000 | | Advance rate | 75% | | Coupon (rate to facility) | 15% | | Net APY to lenders | \~16% | | Term | 12-month revolving + 6-month amortization | | Revolving period end | May 26, 2027 | | Final maturity | November 26, 2027 | | Minimum overcollateralization | 33% | | Underlying WAL | \~124-day weighted-average term | | Collateral | \~15,215 short-duration consumer-installment loans pledged to a bankruptcy-remote SPV | | Underlyer | Short-term installment / debt-consolidation loans up to $1,500 to underserved U.S. consumers | | Credit enhancement | LendSwift retains 25% first-loss equity beneath 3Jane (1.33x OC) | | Collections control | Deposit Account Control Agreement (DACA); tri-party | | Surveillance | Weekly | ### Cash flow structure
LendSwift facility cash flow structure

The facility contributes a blended ~16% net APY. USD3 sits senior (~13.1% APY, ~64% of the stack); sUSD3 sits junior (~32% APY, ~11%); LendSwift funds a 25% first-loss layer beneath both, so defaults erode the originator's equity before either 3Jane tranche is touched.

### How it works
LendSwift flow of funds
1. **Lenders → 3Jane.** Depositors mint **USD3** (senior) or stake into **sUSD3** (junior). 3Jane allocates a portion of pooled capital to the LendSwift line. 2. **3Jane → SPV → LendSwift.** Capital is committed through a bankruptcy-remote SPV. 3Jane holds the senior secured position; LendSwift retains first-loss equity. As LendSwift contributes eligible loans, it draws against the $10M commitment at up to a 75% advance rate. 3. **LendSwift → borrowers.** LendSwift runs the lending business — acquisition, underwriting, origination, servicing. 3Jane provides the balance sheet and monitors the collateral pool. 4. **Borrowers → collection waterfall.** Repayments land in a DACA-controlled account; senior interest and principal to 3Jane are paid first, residual to LendSwift. 5. **Revolving period.** During the 12-month revolving phase, eligible principal collections recycle into new advances. With a \~124-day WAL, the same committed dollar turns over multiple times. 6. **Amortization & wind-down.** After the revolving period, advances stop and collections pay down the senior balance through the USD3 / sUSD3 waterfall. This opens mainstream consumer credit as a new, uncorrelated asset class for cryptonative capital — backed by diversified consumer loans rather than only cryptonative leverage demand. Across thousands of obligors, no single default moves the pool. ## How facilities are reported Every facility is surfaced with live performance data at [app.3jane.xyz/info/pulls/fcc](https://app.3jane.xyz/info/pulls/fcc). Reporting includes: * **Aggregate KPIs** — live facilities, committed capital, deployed capital, average utilization, average net APY, average credit enhancement (warehouse OC), weighted-average remaining term, and total underlying loans. * **Warehouse table** — fintech, asset class, tranche, limit, drawn (+ utilization), APY, loan count, advance rate, maturity, and status. * **Forward-flow table** — fintech, asset class, commitment, deployed (+ utilization), gross APY, loan count, net loss, servicer, term, and status. * **Per-facility detail** — overview (OC snapshot, coupon, maturity, phase), composition (obligor concentration, geography, customer type, vintages), performance (delinquency buckets, vintage curves, roll rates, charge-off / first-payment-default / prepayment trends), liquidity (obligations due, collateral, collections, deploy runway), and terms (test parameters, haircut rulebook, triggers, servicers). * **Loan tape** — where a facility publishes it, an anonymized loan-level tape (loan ID, origination, industry, principal, APR, days-past-due, state, revenue band) with per-loan payment schedules. Borrower identities are never disclosed. Surveillance runs weekly; facility status reads **Active**, **Watch**, **Trigger Tripped**, or **Default**. {% hint style="info" %} This is the first of several facilities. 3Jane is building standing funding rails for short-duration SMB and consumer credit originated by U.S. fintechs — warehouse, forward-flow, and unrated ABS compressed into one programmable conduit. {% endhint %} # Crypto Credit Lines (CCL)
Crypto Credit Lines (CCL) are one of 3Jane's two credit sleeves: uncollateralized USDC credit lines originated **directly** to U.S.-based cryptonatives — yield farmers, traders, sole proprietors, businesses, and AI agents. Where [Fintech Credit Conduits](/backing/fcc) fund other lenders, the CCL sleeve has 3Jane underwrite, originate, service, and hold the receivables itself. It is a two-sided market: suppliers deposit USDC to mint [USD3](/usd3-susd3/suppliers), and optionally stake for sUSD3, gaining exposure to a diversified pool of credit lines to crypto creditors. On the other side, merchants permissionlessly connect their ETH address, bank account via Plaid, and Credit Karma via zkTLS, and instantly generate a 0%-collateral, open-term, variable-rate USDC credit facility. The core money market is an instantiation of the Morpho Blue contract, extended with credit-underwriter, credit-slashing, and interest-rate modules to push credit lines, incentivize repayment, and price address-specific credit default-risk premiums respectively. ## In this section * [Merchants](/backing/ccl/merchants) — how a borrower connects and draws a credit line * [Payments](/backing/ccl/payments) — repayment thresholds, monthly minimums, and syncs * [Merchant Discount Factor Rate](/backing/ccl/merchant-discount-factor-rate) — early-payoff pricing on the advance * [Credit Underwriter](/backing/ccl/credit-underwriter) — the 3CA algorithm, Jane Score, and assets * [Credit Slasher](/backing/ccl/credit-slasher) — default deterrence, legal recourse, and write-offs * [Proofs](/backing/ccl/proofs) & [Privacy & Storage](/backing/ccl/privacy-and-storage) — how offchain data is attested and stored * [Examples](/backing/ccl/examples) — worked underwriting and pull examples * [Pull Credit Line](/backing/ccl/pull-credit-line) — step-by-step guide Pricing math for the advance lives in [Merchant Discount Factor Rate](/backing/ccl/merchant-discount-factor-rate); pool-level and tranche interest math lives in [Pool Interest Rates](/usd3-susd3/pool-interest-rates). # Merchants All **U.S.-based** merchants can permissionlessly access 0% collateral USDC credit lines in real-time\ within two minutes. The connection flow is as follows: 1. **Wallet connection:** Merchant connects any EOA or smart account and signs a nonce, proving address control and anchoring subsequent data to a single on-chain identity. 2. **Bank account connection via Plaid:** OAuth-style login authorizes Plaid to supply real-time balances, 90-day cash-flow, and account history metrics. Data is fetched through a zkTLS relay (zkFetch) that provides a proof of provenance without disclosing raw PII on-chain. 3. **Credit Karma connection:** User logs into credit karma via zkTLS. 3Jane retrieves credit data from TransUnion and Equifax, including credit scores and other metadata. 4. **MCA agreement signature:** The merchant electronically signs the Merchant Cash Advance (MCA) clause, establishing legal recourse and payment terms under U.S. law. Agreement is visibile here: . 5. **Instant drawdown:** The merchant selects any amount up to the approved credit limit and receives USDC in the wallet. Only pay for what you've drawn. Read the [credit underwriter](/backing/ccl/credit-underwriter) section for more details on how it impacts credit lines and interest rates. Read the [guide](/backing/ccl/pull-credit-line) for how to connect offchain Credit Karma and Bank data. {% hint style="info" %} Note: All off-chain data are attested with zkTLS; raw PII remains off-chain. Implementation details are in [Proofs](/backing/ccl/proofs) and [Privacy & Storage](/backing/ccl/privacy-and-storage). {% endhint %}
# Payments ### **AUM Threshold** $$ R\_\text{t-1,t}=\begin{cases} 0, & \min(x\*P\_\text{t-1}, Y)> V\_\text{t-1,1} \ V\_\text{t-1,1}, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} $$ $$ \begin{aligned} P\_\text{t-1} &: \text{Portfolio risk adjusted value at (t-1)} \\ P\_\text{t} &: \text{Portfolio risk adjusted value at (t)} \\ V\_\text{t-1,t} &: \text{Difference in portfolio risk adjusted value between (t) and (t-1)} \\ x &: \text{Parameter determining the relative amount for a repayment to be triggered} \\ Y &: \text{Parameter determining the absolute amount threshold for a repayment to be triggered} \\ P &: \min(\max(LTV\_p, LTV\_{min}), LTV\_{max}) \\ LTV\_p &: \sum{(1+\kappa(\text{vs}*a-\text{ls}*a))\*\text{dp}*a} \\ k &: \text{Risk aversion parameter} \\ vs*\text{a} &: \text{Volatility assessment for asset (a), it is computed using a weighted average} \\ &\quad \text{of VaR values and Expected Shortfall values under different market scenarios.} \\ &\quad \text{The score represents potential loss for this asset over the repayment term (30 days)} \\ &\quad \text{at the 0.5% confidence interval.} \\\[4pt] ls*\text{a} &: \text{Liquidity assessment for asset (a), it is computed by looking at the slippage} \\ &\quad \text{to sell the asset assuming different market conditions (normal and stressed).} \\ &\quad \text{The score represents an estimated cost to liquidate the asset.} \\ dp*\text{a} &: \text{Data penalty for asset a, based on the length of historical data available for this asset.} \end{aligned} $$ ### **Discounted Monthly Payment** Each month the merchant must make the following minimum payment to maintain good standing: If extending credit line midcycle, next first repayment cycle has a discounted monthly payment of 0. Else, next discounted monthly payment is: Monthly Payment \* (1 - (P\_t-1 - P\_t) / P\_t) In the case that the monthly payment is 0, no payment is required. Payment amounts are finalized and displayed on the 15th of each month ahead of the following payment date. Telegram payment reminders: [https://t.me/+gkYFIkjw4DFjMTMx
](https://t.me/+gkYFIkjw4DFjMTMx) **Monthly Sync & Parameter Refresh** Credit Limits and default-risk premiums are re-evaluated every 30 days using the latest bank-cash, CEX balances, and on-chain asset data. # Merchant Discount Factor Rate 3Jane gives you an upfront advance and, in return, buys a fixed specified amount of your future yield. *The Discount Factor Rate (DFR) is a discount that reduces the specified amount if you repay the advance amount early, effectively charging you less. The discount shrinks towards zero over time as the days since funding increases.* $$ \text{RP}(N) = A \times \left( 1 + \sum\_{n=1}^{N} \text{P}\_{n} \right)\\\[2em] \text{DFR}(N) = 1 - \frac{\mathrm{RP}(N) - A}{\mathrm{A} \times (F-1)} $$ $$ \begin{aligned} N &: \text{days since funding} \\\[2pt] A &: \text{advance amount at funding} \\\[2pt] \text{F} &: \text{fixed Factor (set at funding)} \\\[2pt] \text{RP} &: \text{repurchase amount by day N} \\\[2pt] \text{DFR} &: \text{discount factor rate by day N} \\\[2pt] \text{P}\_{n} &: \text{daily pacing increment} \\\[2pt] \end{aligned} $$ Each day, a tiny pacing increment is applied: (1) base factor: the pool’s baseline conditions (utilization) (2) credit risk factor: your credit risk profile (3) urgency factor: whether you were late that day Those three slices add up to your daily fraction Pn​.
$$ \begin{aligned} \text{P}*{n} &: \text{B}*{n} \+ \text{C}*{n} \+ \text{L}*{n} \\\[2pt] \text{B}*{n} &: \text{implied base apy, expressed as a (1) day factor, pool-wide. Derived from the pool’s utilization curve} \\\[2pt] \text{C}*{n} &: \text{implied credit risk apy, expressed as a (1) day factor, per-user. Derived from the 3CA algorithm} \\\[2pt] \text{L}\_{n} &: \text{implied urgency apy, expressed as a (1) day factor, per-user. Applied on days flagged late} \\\[2pt] \end{aligned} $$ Note: DFR according to the formula is updated daily (as of 11:59 p.m. UTC). Your real-time DFR (and hence early payoff amount) will be updated to include time elapsed from last day DFR prior to payment.
**Example:** * Advance: **A = 100,000** * Factor: **F = 1.15** * Specified Amount: **A⋅F = 115,000**
bn
DBnCnLnPnSum PnRP(N)DFR(N)
10.0001150.00004900.0001640.000164100,01699.8904%
20.0001120.00005200.0001640.000328100,03299.7808%
30.0001170.0000460.0001360.0003010.000630100,06399.5799%
40.0001090.00005000.0001600.000790100,07999.4731%
50.0001200.00005300.0001730.000964100,09699.3571%
# Credit Underwriter
The 3Jane Credit Risk Algorithm (3CA) is a 3Jane-operated offchain credit underwriting algorithm that underwrites credit lines against Jane scores and assets, and derives the (1) credit line size, (2) default risk risk premium %, and (3) repayment rate. * **Jane Score**: Composition of onchain & offchain creditworthiness, including Cred score, Blockchain Bureau score, and Equifax / TransUnion VantageScore 3.0 credit scores. * **Assets**: DeFi assets, CEX crypto assets, and bank cash balances. # 3CA Algorithm
The 3CA V1 algorithm is a composition of four discrete sequential engines (Fraud Risk Engine -> Asset Risk Engine -> Credit Risk Engine -> Portfolio Risk Engine) which outputs (1) Credit Line Size, (2) Default Credit Risk Premium %, and (3) Repayment Rate. The 3CA algorithm will evolve over time. > *NOTE 3CA will iterate—each engine’s logic, weights, and data inputs are upgradeable.* ## Fraud Risk Engine The fraud risk engine is responsible for assessing whether the prospective user is engaging in some form of fraud or is too risky for us to engage with. This includes but is not limited to: 1. **Wallet History:** fresh wallet, stale transaction history, OFAC sanctions list, tagged as stolen funds, ransomware, etc. 2. **Browser:** IP address offshore of USA, IP address far from IRL city/state, etc 3. **Bank:** new bank account, limited transaction history, identity associated with a breach, first & second-party fraud, balance stuffing etc. 4. **Credit Karma:** hashed name mismatch with Bank. **Output:** Binary 0/1. Any critical flag ⇒ application rejected. No partial approval. ## Asset Risk Engine The asset risk engine is responsible for assessing the credit line to provide for the prospective user. This engine stress‑tests DeFi portfolios with realistic market dynamics (volatility, correlations, liquidity). We simulate tens of thousands of market paths, apply position‑specific payoffs (lending, LP, yield, vaults, etc.), haircut for liquidity/locks/utilisation, and read the 1% tail (VaR & Expected Shortfall). That tail drives the Loan‑to‑Value (LTV). This engine is specifically designed to measure the following risks of a DeFi portfolio: * **Protocol risk**: smart‑contract, design & counterparty risks (whitelisting gate) ⇒ We only consider assets/protocols that pass our scored whitelisting review. The latter, run with our partner Block Analitica, covers smart-contract risk, protocol design and governance, oracle/design dependencies, and counterparty/operational risk; assets are assigned to risk tiers with associated collateralization limits. If an asset or protocol is not on the list of whitelisted assets, it does not count for collateral. We continuously whitelist new protocols and assets. * **Volatility risk**: how violently each asset can move next epoch ⇒ We look to capture asset volatility dynamics by fitting different GARCH-like models. While we privilege student-t and skew-student-t distributions as opposed to normal distribution to model the standardized errors in our GARCH models, we add another component to model extreme events. Drawn from Extreme Value Theory, we fit the q% most extreme residual values using a Generalized Pareto Distribution. For stablecoins and liquid re/staking assets, we fit a mean reverting process with jumps on top of the GARCH-like model to capture depeg/liquidity discount risk as well as slashing risk. We also add a drift with perturbations to model rates for yield-bearing assets. This framework provides a model to assess the distribution of returns over the next epoch for one asset. * **Correlation risk**: how assets co‑crash in stress ⇒ We model correlation using proprietary models to generate a correlation matrix with heavy tails which is dynamic as a function of recent shocks. This allows us to realistically simulate joint moves in different market scenarios, extreme market behaviours and ultimately returns of correlated assets. * **Liquidity risk**: how costly it is to unwind (or how illiquid/locked a position is) ⇒ We apply a final haircut to the portfolio values based on the liquidity of the position itself. For a spot position, we combine historical orderbook and on-chain liquidity data with slippage models to assess the cost of unwinding in different scenarios. We penalise the terminal values of the portfolio by this estimated cost. For locked positions, we apply a penalty based on the lock time, amount and liquidity (if any) of the locked token. **Outputs:** 1. Value-at-Risk at 1%: the loss level exceeded in 1% of cases over the epoch for a given portfolio. 2. Expected Shortfall at 1%: the average loss if you’re in that worst 1% tail for a given portfolio. 3. Gross Credit Line. Returns \[0, MAX\_SIZE]. After computing the VaR and the ES, we then apply a proprietary, policy-based mapping from tail risk to LTV that also considers liquidity class and protocol risk tier. While we don’t disclose the formula, the policy is designed to be monotonic (larger tails → lower LTV), bounded (floors/caps), and stable (limits on rate-of-change to avoid pro-cyclicality). We continuously monitor realized outcomes versus model predictions and adjust policy ranges when warranted. ## Credit Risk Engine The credit risk engine is responsible for assessing the creditworthiness of a prospective user. **Outputs:** 1. Jane Score. Returns \[300-1000]. See [Jane Score](/backing/ccl/credit-underwriter/jane-score) section for more. 2. Default Credit Risk Premium %. Returns \[MIN\_DRP-MAX\_DRP]. A fixed credit default risk premium applied per-user (risk-adjusted APR quote for an unsecured credit line), based on their Jane score, probability of default (PD) buckets, base pool rate, loss given default (LGD), capital ratio, capital cost, profit floor, profit slope, and max APR. 1. Lookup: Drops the Jane score into a table of default-rate bands derived from U.S. consumer-credit data. 2. Buffer: Inflates those historical default rates with safety cushions (bigger cushion for riskier bands) because 3Jane is a new product. 3. Prices: *Expected loss (PD × LGD) + small profit load + optional capital charge* is added to a base funding rate. 4. Guard-rails: Clips the result at a hard APR ceiling so quotes never exceed policy limits. 3. Repayment Rate. Returns \[MIN\_RR-MAX\_RR]. The minimum repayment rate to maintain good standing on your credit line per month, expressed as a % of your outstanding principal. ## Portfolio Risk Engine The portfolio risk engine is responsible for adjusting the gross credit line based on the overall risk exposure and correlation risk across all the outstanding credit lines. We use proprietary correlation models to stress-test the collateral of pool and compute tail risk metrics. We set caps on: * Max credit line per user * Overall market exposure of the pool * Overall protocol exposure of the pool **Outputs:** 1. Credit Line. Returns \[0, MAX\_SIZE] ### Appendix
# Jane Score Jane Score is a credit score native to the 3Jane protocol (300-1000). It consolidates the following data sources: 1. **Onchain credit scores:** Cred Score (300-1000) & Blockchain Bureau Score (400-732). Both Cred protocol and Blockchain Bureau up a robust credit underwriting framework based on on-chain activity. Combined, both credit scoring services scan over +500m address across 8 EVM chains and +100 DeFi protocols to feed +1000 features into its scoring algorithms. Model is trained on +1000 features, 54bn transactions, and 1PB of data. Every transaction you make - from pulls, repayments, liquidation, coins held, age of address, yield generated, exchanges you interacted with, etc. contributes to a user’s creditworthiness. 2. **Offchain credit scores:** TransUnion VantageScore 3.0 (300-850) and Equifax VantageScore 3.0 (300-850). This includes credit age, credit utilization, derogatory marks, num. hard inquiries, payment history, and total accounts from both credit bureaus. > Your Jane Score may change as the Jane Score algorithm evolves. # Assets 3Jane underwrites credit lines agains the following asset categories. ## **DeFi Assets** 1. **Stablecoins** – Dollar-pegged tokens held directly on chain, e.g., USDC, DAI, crvUSD. 2. **Majors** – Large-cap, high-liquidity crypto assets such as ETH or WBTC. 3. **Altcoins** – Mid- and small-cap ERC-20 tokens that fall outside the major set. 4. **Hard-lock staking & governance locks** – Positions that require a fixed unlock period: native solo-staked validator keys, veCRV, veAERO, veBAL, stkAAVE, etc. 5. **Staked assets** – Liquid staking receipts that track underlying ETH or other majors (stETH, cbETH, rETH). 6. **Restaked assets** – Tokens representing ETH restaked into EigenLayer or similar frameworks (eETH, rsETH). 7. **Money-market receipts** – Interest-bearing tokens like aUSDC or cDAI that represent deposits in lending markets. 8. **DEX LP tokens** – Positions in spot-AMM liquidity pools on Uniswap, Curve, Balancer, etc. 9. **Yield-aggregator vault shares** – Tokens issued by vaults that auto-compound or leverage underlying strategies (e.g., Yearn v3, Etherfi Liquid). 10. **CDP & vault equity** – Net collateral value remaining after subtracting protocol debt in Maker, Liquity, crvUSD LLAMMA bands, and similar vault systems. 11. **Derivatives-DEX LP equity** – Maker or liquidity-provider shares on perpetual-swap venues such as GMX or Hyperliquid. 12. **Bridge-liquidity stakes** – LP tokens earned for supplying same-asset liquidity to cross-chain bridges (Across, Stargate). 13. **Real-world-asset tokens (RWA)** – On-chain receipts backed by T-bills, commercial paper, or other off-chain credit (Ondo OUSDG, Backed ib01). 14. **Principal tokens (PT)** – Discounted tokens that redeem 1:1 for an underlying asset at a future maturity (Pendle PT-USDe-2026, Element PT-stETH). 15. **Yield tokens (YT)** – Tokens that collect all variable yield generated by an underlying asset until maturity (Pendle YT-DAI). 16. **Liquidity Pool tokens (LPT)** – Pendle LPT. 17. **Insurance LP stakes** – Capital positions in on-chain risk pools such as Nexus Mutual. 18. **Lottery tokens** – Prize-savings tickets where interest funds periodic raffles (PoolTogether v5). 19. **Prediction-market shares** – Outcome tokens for binary and scalar events on platforms like Polymarket. 20. **NFTs** – Floor-priced, high-liquidity collections (e.g., CryptoPunks, BAYC) accepted as collateral. 21. **Social-Fi keys** – Tradable creator or community keys (e.g., FriendTech keys). 22. **Options-selling vault shares** – Deposits in covered-call or put-selling strategies (Ribbon Earn, Dopex SSOV). ## **Centralised-exchange (CEX) assets** 1. **Custodied crypto & stablecoins** – Spot balances visible via read-only API keys on venues such as Coinbase or Kraken. 2. **Fiat balances** – USD and other cash holdings inside exchange wallets. 3. **Exchange earn products** – Principal-protected fixed or flexible savings programs offered by exchanges. ## **Traditional bank (via Plaid)** 1. **Checking & savings cash** – Immediately withdrawable USD balances. 2. **Certificates of deposit (CDs)** – Time-locked deposits at regulated U.S. banks. # Credit Slasher The credit slashing module executes three strategies for deterring defaults, namely (1) slashing the 3Jane score which decreases future credit line sizes and increases future interest rates (2) pooled upside model where a portion of late interest repayments from defaulters is distributed pro-rata across all existing merchants (3) initiating a non-performing (NPL) auction which engages collections agencies to pursue legal recourse within the United States legal system.
The credit slashing module executes a series of strategies for deterring defaults: **Carrots** 1. continued $JANE emissions for maintaining a healthy state 2. gradual increase in Jane Score which increase credit limit and decreases implied rates 3. late penalties from defaulters is distributed pro-rata across all healthy merchants which decreases all-in implied rates **Sticks** 1. slashing accrued $JANE balance, pro-rata based on days since default. Slashed $JANE is redistributed across existing merchants. 2. slashing Jane Score which decreases future credit line sizes (or excludes entirely) and increases future implied rates 3. initiating a non-performing (NPL) auction which engages collections agencies to pursue legal recourse within the United States legal system. Note: 3Jane does not currently furnish to traditional credit bureaus. This is due to the fact that direct litigation is much higher ROI. # Legal Recourse **Level 1** If merchant falls into default, whether because they choose not to remit yield as required, or because they violate an operating covenant, 3Jane will first work with merchants on a friendly basis to get merchants back on track. Whether it be making payments or realigning portfolio positioning, situation specific. **Level 2** However, should amicable outreach not be successful, 3Jane reserves the right to declare events of default, which may in turn develop into an acceleration of the balance owed. In this event, 3Jane would have all rights and remedies as would any other creditor. At the time of first funding, 3Jane takes a security interest against the yield it is purchasing via the parties’ signed agreement, as well as perfects said interest by filing a UCC-1, such that should there be a default that goes uncured, pursuant to Article 9 of the UCC, 3Jane would be within its rights to seize such onchain assets to pay down the account balance owing to 3Jane. Funds may be recovered from stablecoin issuers, CEXs, and, if necessary, through a court order compelling the wallet holder to disclose or use the private key to repay (level 3). **Level 3** 3Jane would also be within its rights to pursue the merchant through traditional methods, including arbitration or court proceedings. Should 3Jane be awarded a judgment, 3Jane would seek to enforce its judgment against any and all assets of the merchant, consistent with applicable U.S. state law. This may include DeFi, CEX, bank, and brokerage assets. DeFi Advance Agreement: #### Non-Performing (NPCL) Auction At the start, 3Jane will attempt collection in-house. After +60d, depending on the ticket size 3Jane may choose to continue to attempt collections in-house or alternatively initiate an auction. 3Jane initiates an onchain dutch auction for licensed U.S.-based collections agencies to bid on\ collecting the debt on a contingency basis, meaning if they are successful in collecting they get to keep a share of the principal repaid. The lifecycle is as follows: 1. Auction is triggered by delinquency and 3Jane shares merchant profile with all onboarded collections agencies, including onchain/offchain credit data, assets, and cash flows. Does not include PII 2. The contingency rate Rc increases over time until an agency accepts. 3Jane shares private user data with the particular collections agency 3. Agencies proceed to collect on the debt via skip tracing (TLOxp). These agencies have multiple means of incentivizing repayment, including getting a court injunction to force repayment and subsequent wage garnishment, bank account levies, CEX levies, and freezing onchain assets. 4. If successful, merchant directly repays outstanding balance onchain. Funds redistributed to money market, collections agency, and existing merchant. TLOxp is a powerful skip tracing and debt recovery tool that equips licensed collections agencies with 100 billion public and proprietary data points that helps agencies locate debtors and verify identities. # Debt Write-Off When a credit line becomes delinquent, its market value should reflect both the probability of loss and the probability of recovery. Instead of an immediate full markdown to zero, we apply a time-based linear markdown to delinquent credit: value starts near par and decays smoothly to zero over a configured duration T. This ensures that the markdown reflects real-world expectations while preserving the option for future recoveries. This reflects declining recovery likelihood while reducing panic risk from sudden write-downs, and keeps solvency accounting predictable. The total adjusted market value M (t) of a credit line is given by: $$ m(t)=1-\min!\left(1,\frac{t}{T}\right) $$ $$ \text{where } \begin{cases} \begin{aligned} t &= \text{Time in days since delinquency began} \\ T &= \text{Full markdown duration from protocol config} \\ ``` m(t) &= \text{Market value multiplier} \\ \end{aligned} \end{cases} ``` $$ This model ensures an accurate valuation of non-performing credit lines while maintaining protocol solvency and preventing market panic from sudden markdowns to zero. This function ensures that in the early stages of delinquency, recoveries are still probable, reducing the markdown severity. However, as delinquency time increases, the likelihood of successful recovery diminishes. By dynamically adjusting for expected recovery, it provides a more nuanced and realistic approach to loss recognition. Credit lines are preemptively marked down to 0 cents on the dollar upon delinquency status in order to disincentivize runs on the money market. The markdown algorithm may change as the protocol evolves and we collect more data points about historical recovery processes. ### Insurance Fund 3Jane has seeded $1M insurance fund which acts as first-loss capital in the case of any losses due to fraud risk and credit risk. The insurance fund steps in with a settle() call that preemptively makes funds whole at the default phase after which point 3Jane recovers funds on its own behalf to replenish the insurance fund. # Default Game Theory One of Ethereum’s superpowers is around the idea of game warping — the ability to alter the game theory equilibrium by ensuring perpetual credible commitments onchain through code. Turns out, unsecured credit is the perfect application for this — by creating (1) perpetual credible commitments of triggering off-chain collections and (2) creating an immutable record of the default we significantly alter the game theory payoff for strategically defaulting. Essentially, the ledger creates both certainty of enforcement and an undeniable evidence trail that makes traditional legal remedies more effective and increases the opportunity cost of attempting to strategically default compared to traditional off-chain creditors. This increases credit market efficiencies, tightens the spreads, and minimizes credit rationing. Initially, any defaults that do occur will be strategic in that the merchant can repay but does not want to. This type of merchant maps high on ”ability to repay” and extremely low on ”willingness to repay”, and short of fraud, credit furnishing and collections is historically effective particularly for mass-affluent/high-net worth individuals. # Proofs ## zkTLS Proofs 3Jane uses Reclaim protocol, which leverages the zkTLS proxy model, in order to fetch and prove the\ integrity of HTTPS responses of a user’s VantageScore 3.0 score via Credit Karma, CEX assets, and Bank cash & other cash flows via Plaid, without introducing additional trust assumptions on the user or the protocol itself. Furthermore, 3Jane utilizes EigenLayer’s cryptoeconomic security to ensure a collusion resistant set of designated verifiers that scales with credit line sizes. Proofs will be posted onchain by the credit underwriting module alongside the corresponding data, giving depositors the ability to audit the health of the merchant pool. This is critical for 3Jane’s architecture for two reasons: 1. Extracting offchain credit data: traditionally, in order to access a user’s credit data the\ merchant must (1) provide their social security number (SSN) and (2) the merchant must be on-boarded with 1-2 of the major credit bureaus, after which point the lender uses your SSN to do a hard check with the credit bureaus to receive your credit report. 3Jane avoids collecting SSN’s and hard checks entirely by leveraging zkTLS to trustlessly and privately extract your credit data directly from your Credit Karma account upon log in without introducing additional trust\ assumptions onto the user 2. Selective disclosure of offchain balances: in order to maximize the auditability of the\ merchant pool by creditors, 3Jane leverages zkTLS to make onchain proofs about some statement on the API response, in particular whether the CEX and bank balance is greater than or equal to some floor Vf > Zero-knowledge TLS (zkTLS) allows one to obtain and prove the provenance of arbitrary HTTPS traffic, and without revealing personal identifiable information associated with that HTTPS session. ## zkCoprocessor Proofs 3Jane leverages Lagrange protocol’s zero-knowledge coprocessor (zkCoprocessor) to prove arbitrary current or historical state of any EVM chain pertaining to an address, ensuring onchain failsafes for credit underwriting and turning away flagged sybils, fraud, or uncreditworthy users on the smart contract level. # Privacy & Storage ## **Bank via Plaid** **Connection:** upon connecting to your bank, we only store (1) bank balance and (2) an AES-256 encrypted [**asset report token**](https://plaid.com/docs/api/products/assets/#create-an-asset-report) in our database provided to us by Plaid. The asset report token allows us to make an API request to Bank servers to collect PII at a later point in time. You will be able to disconnect at any point via which severs our ability to access to your personal data from Bank servers. This approach strikes a balance between collecting minimal viable personal data whilst maintaining effective collection strategies by outsourcing skip tracing to licensed collections agencies with access to commercial databases via TLOxp. We do NOT have access to Social Security Numbers or Date of Birth. **Repayment:** a “purge PII” button appears in your dashboard. Pressing it deletes the four fields above and leaves only hashed bank acct + anonymized credit history. You may reconnect Plaid later to reopen a line of credit. ## **Credit Karma via zkTLS** **Connection:** upon connecting to your credit karma, we store in our database (1) credit scores, credit age, credit utilization, derogatory marks, num. hard inquiries, payment history, and total accounts (non-PII) and (2) a SHA-256 **hash** of your first and last name to ensure the credit data belongs to the bank account. We do NOT store any personally identifiable information (PII) from Credit Karma. Connecting to credit karma does NOT trigger a hard check on your credit report. ## **Dropbox Signatures** **Signing Legal Doc:** when we initiate a signing flow, your personal information (such as your name, email, and home address) is passed through in real time by making an API call to Plaid's banking servers on the fly and immediately merged into the Dropbox Sign document template. This process is purely ephemeral. Your details exist only in memory during the request and are never cached, logged, or written to our databases. **No persistence on our servers.** Because all handling and enrichment occur in transit, our infrastructure never retains your personal data, it is used solely to generate the document at the moment of signing. The signed legal document is securely stored in an isolated Dropbox repository within Dropbox - this will include your full name, email, phone number, and home address. You will only have to do this once. ## **Browser** **Connection:** upon connecting your wallet, we store the IP address for fraud-risk scoring. # Examples Worked examples of how 3Jane underwrites and prices a [Crypto Credit Line](/backing/ccl), and how a borrower pulls one. * [Pull Example - Farmer 1](/backing/ccl/examples/pull-example-farmer-1) * [Pull Example - Trader 1](/backing/ccl/examples/pull-example-trader-1) * [Underwriting Example](/backing/ccl/examples/underwriting-example) # Pull Example - Farmer 1
**Option 1:** Overcollateralized Borrowing 1. Collateralize 52K ETH and borrow 25K USDC against it @ 5.33% variable APR via Aave (50% LTV) 2. Collateralize 27K S and borrow 13K USDC against it @ 3.27% variable APR via Aave Sonic (50% LTV) 3. Result: 38K USDC @ blended 4.63% APR **Option 2:** 3Jane Unsecured Credit 1. 3CA underwrites against onchain transactions, offchain credit score, and entire DeFi/CEX/Bank financial profile. Generates a 141K USDC credit line (15.1% of asset value) at 7.93% variable APR (including a fixed 2.6% credit default risk premium above 5.33% SOFR) 2. Pull up to 141K USDC 3. Result: 141K USDC @ blended 7.93% APR # Pull Example - Trader 1
**Option 1:** Overcollateralized Borrowing 1. Collateralize 19.9K LINK and borrow 10K USDC against it @ 5.33% variable APR via Aave (50% LTV) 2. Result: 10K USDC @ blended 5.33% APR **Option 2:** 3Jane Unsecured Credit 1. 3CA underwrites against onchain transactions, offchain credit score, and entire DeFi/CEX/Bank financial profile. Generates a 68K USDC credit line (11% of asset value) at 8.73% variable APR (including a fixed 3.4% credit default risk premium above 5.33% SOFR) 2. Pull up to 68K USDC 3. Result: 68K USDC @ blended 8.73% APR # Underwriting Example Let’s walk through a real-life example of a borrower requesting a credit line. The user holds the following positions: * Locked position on Base: 5,000 [AERO](https://x.com/AerodromeFi) tokens locked until 2028/11/29 * Staked position on Hypercore: 500 HYPE tokens staked on [Hyperliquid](https://x.com/HyperliquidX) * Borrow/lend positions on HyperEVM and Plasma: * On [Hyperlend](https://x.com/hyperlendx): * Supplying 5,156 HYPE, 3,080 [kHYPE](https://x.com/kinetiq_xyz) and 1,237 PT-kHYPE * Borrowing 2,000 HYPE * On [Euler](https://x.com/eulerfinance): * Supplying 1,000,000 [USDai](https://x.com/USDai_Official) * Borrowing 900,000 [USDT0](https://x.com/USDT0_to) * Lending vault position: 5.3 WETH on the [Re7](https://x.com/Re7Labs) Morpho vault on Ethereum Mainnet * LP position on HyperEVM: Supplied concentrated liquidity on [ProjectX](https://x.com/prjx_hl) for the pair WHYPE/USDT0. The current value of the portfolio is $512,425, as of 28th of October 2025. The Value-at-Risk at 1% is -34.58%, and the Expected Shortfall at 1% is -39.19%. The initial weight contributions are: * Project X LP position: 0.3% * Aave leveraged lending position: 32.7% * Hyperlend lending position: 58.1% * Staked HYPE position: 3.9% * Morpho vault position: 3.4% * Locked AERO position: 1.6% Assuming a credit score of 777, this user would be approved for a credit line of $90,000 at 10% implied APR. # Pull Credit Line
1. Go to app.3jane.xyz/pull 2. Click "Pull Credit Line" to connect your wallet and generate your credit line 3. Connect Credit Karma via zkTLS to boost credit line (up to 4.5x) and decrease APR (up to 2x) 1. Video Guide: 2. Troubleshooting: are you connected to a vpn on your phone? 4. Connect Bank via Plaid to boost credit line by up to 4.5x 5. Pull USDC \[Soon] Note: 1. You must connect to your bank account in order to claim a spot in the first merchant cohort # Liquidity Mining 3Jane is a credit-based money market that extends credit facilities via warehouse facilities and forward-flow programs to U.S.-based fintech lenders, powering the next generation of fintech originators with a cryptonative balance sheet. [Read more →](https://www.3jane.xyz/reports/3jane-is-evolving) Since inception, 3Jane has executed two transactions: * A **$10M warehouse facility** with LendSwift, a U.S. consumer-installment lender. * An **$8.5M whole-loan purchase** of SMB line-of-credit receivables from Slope, the embedded credit infrastructure behind neobanks like Slash and Fortune 10 e-commerce platforms. 3Jane is now opening deposits to the public alongside existing liquidity providers to accelerate growth into an expanding pipeline. ## $JANE liquidity mining program 3Jane's liquidity mining program is live. In a deviation from precedent, rewards are paid in locked $JANE, the protocol's token, giving users a direct stake on day 1. JANE emissions are distributed against a variable total token supply, fixed at final mint in 2026. Transferability will be enabled alongside final mint. Each week, 3Jane distributes JANE across several farms accretive to the protocol. Each farm's weekly emission has a floor, and that floor scales up as TVL grows. **As a result, early TVL earns an outsized share.**
Final supply split timeline

During liquidity mining (now → final mint 2026), LPs are emitted x (JANE, 100% of emissions); at final mint the final supply (z) is fixed within 1.111B–6.667B and the rest of supply (z − x) goes to remaining protocol stakeholders, with transferability enabled — so x and (z − x) sum to z.

**Key Terms:** 1. Earn JANE by growing the protocol. Locked until final mint 2. JANE final supply range: **1,111,111,111 – 6,666,666,666** 3. New JANE emissions are claimable every 7 days. 100% goes to liquidity providers until final mint 4. JANE accrued is fixed, but its % of total token supply is variable until final mint 5. Fixed JANE emission floor per epoch; the floor scales up after a farm's internal TVL goal is hit 6. Final mint occurs in 2026, issuing the remaining supply to other protocol stakeholders and enabling transferability 7. Accrued JANE is calculated from daily TWAB snapshots 8. $JANE address: 0x333333330522f64ee8d0b3039c460b41670e3404 **You are underwriting $JANE total token supply and $JANE FDV upon final mint.** ## Core Mechanics ### Convexity
Two-regime scaling: weekly JANE vs implied APY around a farm's TVL goal

Illustrative: how weekly JANE and implied APY behave on either side of a farm's TVL goal — below the goal JANE is fixed and APY is high and convex; above the goal APY holds in its target band while JANE scales with TVL.

Each farm has a target internal APY and a TVL goal: 1. **Below the goal**, the farm emits a fixed weekly JANE amount. The pie is fixed while TVL is still small, so JANE per $1 deposited is high: early depositors are disproportionately rewarded. This is the convex part of the curve. 2. **At and above the goal**, emissions scale with participation, holding JANE per $1 steady so APY stays in its target band as later capital arrives. The variable flips at the goal. Early: JANE fixed, APY variable (high). Late: APY fixed, JANE variable (scales with TVL). Neither regime dilutes the other. ### Scaling Mechanism
Cumulative JANE emitted as a percentage of total token supply

Illustrative: cumulative JANE emitted as a percentage of total token supply, drawn as a stepped band — the same running emission total divided by the low and high ends of the TTS range, producing a fixed 6× band that steps up each epoch.

Realized APY is a function of (a) final total token supply and (b) FDV when transferability is enabled. ## USD3 & sUSD3 USD3 is a credit-backed yieldcoin earning from warehouse facilities, forward-flow programs, and credit lines. It is the senior tranche of the funding structure, protected by the sUSD3 junior tranche beneath it. sUSD3 is staked USD3 and earns levered yield as a junior tranche first-loss capital of the funding structure, absorbing any credit impairment before USD3. It sits behind every external credit enhancement in each facility, including but not limited to first-loss equity and cash reserves. USD3 initial supply cap: $50,000,000. ## What Earns $JANE | Farm | First epoch Min. JANE Emission | First epoch % of JANE Total Token Supply¹ | Address | | ------------------ | ------------------------------ | ----------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------ | | USD3 | 600,000 JANE | 0.009% – 0.054% | 0x056b269eb1f75477a8666ae8c7fe01b64dd55ecc | | sUSD3 | 300,000 JANE | 0.0045% – 0.027% | 0xf689555121e529ff0463e191f9bd9d1e496164a7 | | Morpho USDC Supply | 50,000 JANE | 0.00075% – 0.0045% | 0xe05fadf242331808f504661bea65972594869826 | | YT-USD3-17DEC2026 | 200,000 JANE | 0.003% – 0.018% | 0x5cffcc9ddef0fdcf395e2ea24ca5ed5a12032706 | | PLP-USD3-17DEC2026 | 50,000 JANE | 0.00075% – 0.0045% | 0x4a5067c3ff1abb7449244025b0e37feaf77d8e3e | | USD3/frxUSD | 50,000 JANE | 0.00075% – 0.0045% | 0x7ba89bc658c07569cfa6d7947adaa80181a24568 | | 3Jane USDC Pull | 100,000 JANE | 0.0015% – 0.009% | N/A | | PT-USD3-17DEC2026 | N/A | N/A | 0x7f47c3e6b2c00fc4eb4d5ae50d0ab0ab6888eb4d | | **Total** | **1,350,000** | **0.0203% – 0.1215%** | N/A | ¹ Low end = emission ÷ 6,666,666,666 (max supply); high end = emission ÷ 1,111,111,111 (min supply). * First epoch is indicative. Floor emissions change every week with existing TVL, protocol goals, and market signals. * As 3Jane adds farms, each epoch's JANE share may be redirected to other farms based on protocol goals at the time. * Once a farm hits its internal target KPIs, its JANE emission scales in real time to hold the same JANE per $1 deposited (see Convexity, above). * YT-USD3 gets both YT-specific incentives + native USD3 incentives. * Pendle LPT incentives are based on SY in the pool but get both LPT-specific incentives + native USD3 incentives. * USD3/frxUSD incentives are based on notional value. * Morpho suppliers get additional USDC-denominated incentives for supplying into the 3Jane ecosystem vault, on top of native lending APY. ## YT-USD3-17DEC2026 YT holders get the sum of (a) native USD3 emissions and (b) YT bonus emissions outlined below. For the first epoch, the YT-USD3-17DEC2026 farm has an explicit internal TVL goal of **$5,000,000**. As its TVL grows across the epoch: | YT-USD3 TVL | Regime | Weekly JANE | JANE emission multiple / YT | | ----------- | ------------------- | ----------- | --------------------------- | | $1.25M | Fixed (below $5M) | 200,000 | 4× | | $2.5M | Fixed (below $5M) | 200,000 | 2× | | $5M | Inflection | 200,000 | 1× | | $10M | Scaling (above $5M) | 400,000 | 1× | | $20M | Scaling (above $5M) | 800,000 | 1× | Below the $5M goal, the weekly JANE pool is fixed at 200,000, so the less TVL there is, the more JANE each dollar earns — the earliest depositors, when TVL is lowest, get the most JANE per dollar (4× the steady rate at $1.25M, 2× at $2.5M). Once TVL passes $5M, the weekly JANE grows in step with TVL — 2× the TVL pays 2× the JANE, 4× pays 4× — so every dollar earns the same steady rate from then on. Rewards accrue from daily balance snapshots (TWAB): you earn by holding day to day, not by timing your deposit. [Earn $JANE →](https://app.3jane.xyz/farm) *** **Additional mechanics** — see [Credit Slasher](/backing/ccl/credit-slasher) and its interoperability with the $JANE token. This will evolve into a more tightly-coupled and comprehensive tokenomics as the protocol scales and we learn what works and what doesn't — this may include governance, staking, fee accrual, slashing, and other novel mechanisms that are value accretive to both the protocol and token. # Protocol Global Config #### Credit Line Parameters
ParameterDescription
MAX_LTVSets the maximum loan-to-value ratio allowed for credit lines. Validates that credit/vv ≤ maxLTV to ensure borrowers maintain sufficient collateral.
MAX_VVSets the maximum value that can be verified for a single credit line. Prevents excessive single-position exposure by capping the verified value
MAX_CREDIT_LINESets the maximum credit amount that can be extended to a merchant. Controls the upper bound of credit exposure per merchant.
MIN_CREDIT_LINESets the minimum credit amount that can be extended to a merchant. Controls the lower bound of credit exposure per merchant to prevent non-collectible dust.
MAX_DRPSets the maximum default risk premium rate that can be charged. Caps the risk premium to prevent excessive costs
#### Market Control Parameters
ParameterDescription
IS_PAUSEDControls whether the market is active or paused. Emergency circuit breaker to halt all market operations
MAX_ON_CREDITSets the maximum percentage of total supply that can be deployed into the MorphoCredit pool. Controls overall market utilization.
DEBT_CAPSets the absolute maximum total debt allowed across market. Hard cap on total protocol debt to manage systemic risk.
#### Market Timing Parameters
ParameterDescription
GRACE_PERIODDuration after payment cycle end before delinquency begins. Gives merchants time to make payments after cycle end.
DELINQUENCY_PERIODDuration of delinquency before default status. Time window for merchants to catch up on payments whilst paying penalty.
CYCLE_DURATIONDuration of each payment cycle. Defines the regular payment schedule for merchants.
MIN_BORROWMinimum outstanding loan balance to prevent dust positions. Ensures meaningful amounts to enforce collectibility.
IRPPenalty rate per second for delinquent merchants. Additional interest charged during delinquency period.
#### Interest Rate Model (IRM) Parameters
ParameterDescription
CURVE_STEEPNESSControls how steeply interest rates change with utilization. Higher values create more aggressive rate adjustments.
ADJUSTMENT_SPEEDSpeed at which rates adjust toward target based on utilization error. Controls how quickly rates respond to market conditions.
TARGET_UTILIZATIONOptimal utilization rate where interest rates are at baseline. Reference point for rate adjustments.
INITIAL_RATE_AT_TARGETBaseline interest rate when utilization equals target. Starting point for rate calculations.
MIN_RATE_AT_TARGETFloor for the rate at target utilization. Prevents rates from going too low.
MAX_RATE_AT_TARGETCeiling for the rate at target utilization. Prevents rates from going too high.
#### USD3 & sUSD3 Tranche Parameters
ParameterDescription
TRANCHE_RATIOMaximum subordination ratio for sUSD3 deposits. Controls how much of the total debt can be subordinated to sUSD3 holders.
TRANCHE_SHARE_VARIANTDetermines the performance fee structure for sUSD3. Configures how profits are shared between USD3 and sUSD3 holders.
MIN_SUSD3_BACKING_RATIOMinimum percentage of debt that must be backed by sUSD3 assets. Ensures sufficient backing for subordinated debt
SUSD3_LOCK_DURATIONMinimum time sUSD3 must be locked before withdrawal. Prevents rapid withdrawal and ensures commitment
SUSD3_COOLDOWN_PERIODWaiting period after lock expires before withdrawal window opens. Additional time buffer before withdrawals are allowed
USD3_COMMITMENT_TIMETime period for USD3 commitment before deployment. Ensures commitment before funds are deployed
SUSD3_WITHDRAWAL_WINDOWDuration of the withdrawal window after cooldown. Time limit for completing withdrawals.
USD3_SUPPLY_CAPMaximum total supply of USD3 tokens. Controls overall protocol size and risk exposure.
#### Markdown Parameters
ParametersDescription
FULL_MARKDOWN_DURATIONTime required for 100% markdown of defaulted positions. Controls how quickly defaulted positions are written down
#### Parameter Relationships and Usage These parameters work together to create a comprehensive risk management system: 1. **Credit Risk Management**: MAX\_LTV, MAX\_VV, MAX\_CREDIT\_LINE, MIN\_CREDIT\_LINE, and MAX\_DRP control individual borrower risk 2. **Market Risk Management**: DEBT\_CAP, MAX\_ON\_CREDIT, and USD3\_SUPPLY\_CAP control overall protocol exposure 3. **Interest Rate Management**: The IRM parameters create an adaptive interest rate system that responds to utilization 4. **Tranche Management**: The USD3/sUSD3 parameters control the subordination structure and withdrawal mechanics 5. **Default Management**: GRACE\_PERIOD, DELINQUENCY\_PERIOD, and FULL\_MARKDOWN\_DURATION control the default and recovery process 6. **Backing Requirements**: MIN\_SUSD3\_BACKING\_RATIO ensures sufficient backing for subordinated debt All parameters are stored in a single mapping and can be updated by the protocol owner through the `setConfig` function, providing flexibility for protocol evolution while maintaining security through proper access controls. # Risks ## Risks to Suppliers (USD3 / sUSD3) Suppliers are exposed to both credit sleeves through the shared capital stack. sUSD3 absorbs first losses (net recoveries) ahead of USD3. 1. **Smart-contract risk.** Bugs, oracle failures, or economic exploits. Mitigations: third-party audits, formal verification of rate math, circuit breakers. 2. **Credit default risk — Crypto Credit Lines.** A merchant fails to repay due to unwillingness, an asset shortfall from price risk, or idiosyncratic events (lost keys, hack). Mitigations: 3CA underwriting, dynamic default-risk-premium pricing, monthly model refresh, the sUSD3 junior tranche and insurance fund, and external collections via the [Credit Slasher](/backing/ccl/credit-slasher). 3. **Fraud risk — Crypto Credit Lines.** First-, second-, or third-party fraud (no intent to repay; colluding to connect a bank account not owned by the key holder; use of a compromised or synthetic identity). Mitigations: zkTLS-attested proofs, identity and bank verification, conservative limits, and collections. 4. **Counterparty & servicing risk — Fintech Credit Conduits.** An originator underperforms, mis-services, or fails. Mitigations: bankruptcy-remote SPVs that insulate collateral from the originator, DACA control over collection accounts, backup-servicer arrangements, originator first-loss equity, and weekly surveillance. LP exposure is to thousands of underlying obligors, not to the fintech itself. 5. **Structural & collateral-performance risk — Fintech Credit Conduits.** Underlying receivables default above expectations, or correlated stress hits a pool. On structured facilities **USD3 sits as the senior tranche** — behind originator first-loss equity, overcollateralization, reserves, performance triggers, and the sUSD3 junior tranche — so it is structured to be impaired only in a **great-financial-crisis-equivalent correlated-stress scenario**, beyond historically observed SMB / consumer loss. Mitigations: overcollateralization and advance-rate haircuts, performance triggers, and diversification across thousands of obligors. See [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution) and the [USD3 / sUSD3 ABF risk analysis](https://www.3jane.xyz/reports/usd3-susd3-abf-risks). 6. **Settlement & banking risk.** The dollar leg — offramp, wires, collection, onramp — runs through [Erebor](/backing/fcc/banking-rail-erebor). Mitigations: a nationally chartered U.S. bank, controlled collection accounts, and auditable on-chain ↔ bank reconciliation. 7. **Liquidity & duration risk.** Redemption requests exceed available cash, against credit assets that are longer-dated than instant redemption. Mitigations: a cash buffer, short-duration self-liquidating receivables, secondary markets, and committed liquidity facilities (roadmap) — see [Liquidity](/usd3-susd3/liquidity). 8. **Oracle & rate-feed risk.** Manipulated price or SOFR feeds distort LTVs and rates. Mitigations: redundant Chainlink feeds, internal TWAP guards, emergency "pause & price-lock" switch. 9. **Governance / upgrade risk.** Malicious or negligent parameter changes. Mitigations: multisig with time-lock, published upgrade roadmap, veto window for USD3 governance token holders (roadmap). ## Risks to Merchants (Crypto Credit Lines) 1. **Privacy & data-leak risk.** Exposure of KYC, bank, or bureau data. Mitigations: minimal viable data stored, off-chain encrypted storage, hashed proofs on-chain. 2. **Collateral-valuation drift.** Haircuts may tighten, lowering a credit limit or raising implied rates. Mitigations: monthly re-scoring, merchant dashboard alerts for material changes. # Addresses ### Smart Contracts (Ethereum Mainnet) | Contract | Info | Address | | ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | USD3 | Senior tranche. Yearn Strategy, inherits ERC-4626 | [0x056B269Eb1f75477a8666ae8C7fE01b64dD55eCc](https://etherscan.io/address/0x056B269Eb1f75477a8666ae8C7fE01b64dD55eCc#code) | | sUSD3 | Junior tranche. Yearn Strategy, inherits ERC-4626 | [0xf689555121e529ff0463e191f9bd9d1e496164a7](https://etherscan.io/address/0xf689555121e529ff0463e191f9bd9d1e496164a7#code) | | Helper | Helper for USD3/sUSD3 deposits and credit lines draws. Wraps/unwraps between waETHUSDC | [0x82736F81A56935c8429ADdbDa4aEBec737444505](https://etherscan.io/address/0x82736F81A56935c8429ADdbDa4aEBec737444505#code) | | MorphoCredit | Core money market logic. Augmentation of Morpho Blue. | [0xDe6e08ac208088cc62812Ba30608D852c6B0EcBc](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDe6e08ac208088cc62812Ba30608D852c6B0EcBc#code) | | ProtocolConfig | Configuration for core money market parameters. | [0x6b276A2A7dd8b629adBA8A06AD6573d01C84f34E](https://etherscan.io/address/0x6b276A2A7dd8b629adBA8A06AD6573d01C84f34E#code) | | AdaptiveCurveIRM | Interest Rate Curve for the pool. | [0x1d434D2899f81F3C3fdf52C814A6E23318f9C7Df](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1d434D2899f81F3C3fdf52C814A6E23318f9C7Df#code) | | CreditLine | Manager for setting user credit lines. | [0x26389b03298BA5DA0664FfD6bF78cF3A7820c6A9](https://etherscan.io/address/0x26389b03298BA5DA0664FfD6bF78cF3A7820c6A9#code) | | MarkdownController | Manager for marking down defaulted credit lines. | [0xF0eaE71092F3c9411A9EAb8F81E7d91D29726214](https://etherscan.io/address/0xF0eaE71092F3c9411A9EAb8F81E7d91D29726214#code) | | InsuranceFund | Insurance fund for pool backstop. | [0x4507B5B23340D248457d955a211C8B0634D29935](https://etherscan.io/address/0x4507B5B23340D248457d955a211C8B0634D29935#code) | | JANE | Jane Token | [0x333333330522f64ee8d0b3039c460b41670e3404](https://etherscan.io/address/0x333333330522f64ee8d0b3039c460b41670e3404#code) | | RewardsDistributor | Distributor of $JANE rewards | [0xaC6985D4dBcd89CCAD71DB9bf0309eaF57F064e8](https://etherscan.io/address/0xaC6985D4dBcd89CCAD71DB9bf0309eaF57F064e8#code) | ### Permissions | Role | Info | Address | | ------------------ | ----- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | TimelockController | Admin | [0x1dCcD4628d48a50C1A7adEA3848bcC869f08f8C2](https://etherscan.io/address/0x1dCcD4628d48a50C1A7adEA3848bcC869f08f8C2#code) | | Multisig | Owner | [0x33333333Bd7045F1A601A1E289D7AB21036fB5EF](https://etherscan.io/address/0x33333333Bd7045F1A601A1E289D7AB21036fB5EF#code) | Repository: {% embed url="" %} # FAQ **What can funds be used for?** * Trading, yield farming, working capital * Use for personal expenses is expressly NOT allowed **Who can get a credit line?** * U.S.-based mass affluent / high-net worth market-neutral yield farmers with onchain history, a credit karma account, and a bank account. **How long might offchain recoveries take?** * Recoveries from UCC-1 via CEX can take 2-3 months. * Recoveries from a default judgment averages 6 months. Contested and litigated can average \~2yrs. **Why did my credit line get rejected?** * You are not U.S.-based * Your onchain balance is below $25K. This is to ensure collections efforts are economically viable. * Your onchain address is too fresh * The assets you hold / strategies you engage in are outside our credit box * Your credit score is too low * We believe you are engaging in first/second/third party fraud **Does 3Jane furnish to defaults to credit bureaus?** * Although possible, 3Jane does \*not\* currently furnish to credit bureaus given that direct litigation is an often more effective approach to recoveries for our expected ticket sizes and user profile. Court judgments however, should 3Jane be awarded one, do find their way to credit reports. **Does 3Jane need any state lending licences in the United States?** * No, 3Jane is not a lender. 3Jane extends merchant cash advances which is a purchase on future receivables. **What is "total value verified"?** * Total Value Verified (TVV) is the real-time USD value of every verifiable dollar that stands behind the pool's deployed credit, across both sleeves. It spans idle USDC parked in Aave, the backing of FCC facilities (eligible receivables plus originator first-loss equity, or purchased-loan principal and interest), the verified onchain, CEX, and bank assets that size CCL credit limits, and capital staged through Erebor. It rebalances automatically as utilization changes and capital moves between sleeves. See [Backing](/backing/backing). **What are the credit lines underwritten against?** * Against the user's Jane Score + a risk-adjusted LTV of their verified assets—stablecoins, majors, altcoins, staked tokens, LP shares, CEX cash, and bank balances **What are the max LTVs?** * Per-asset LTVs range between 5%-95%. Subject to change. **What is the redemption process for USD3?** * No fee. USD3 can be redeemed up to the tranche ratio. **What is the redemption process for sUSD3?** * sUSD3 has a 1-month lock. After that, you start a cooldown and withdraw within a withdrawal window. **What is the difference between USD3 and sUSD3?** * Both are yield-bearing ERC-4626 tokens that represent 3Jane deposits. **USD3** is the senior tranche: it earns a variable share of pool yield, is credit-enhanced, and is the last to be impaired in the waterfall. **sUSD3** is the junior, first-loss tranche: it earns the levered junior share of pool yield, absorbs losses (net recoveries) before USD3, and carries a 1-month lock. * Both tranches take a fixed *proportion* of whatever the backing generates, so both rates float with pool yield — the senior is not paid a fixed coupon. See [Pool Interest Rates](/usd3-susd3/pool-interest-rates). * $JANE emissions are layered on top of native yield for both tranches — see [Liquidity Mining](/jane/liquidity-mining). **What are the legal recourse mechanisms in case a borrower defaults?** * 3Jane reserves all rights and remedies to pursue the customer for the advance balance owed, including, but not limited to, pursuing rights in arbitration, pursuing rights in court, if a judgment were awarded, pursuing all rights available by law to enforce such judgment to get paid in full, including the recoupment of attorneys' fees, court costs and post-judgment interest. * Funds may be recovered from stablecoin issuers, CEXs, and, if necessary, through a court order compelling the wallet holder to disclose or use the private key to repay. **What legal recourse do suppliers have?** * Individual supppliers do not pursue merchants directly * Their claim is enforced collectively through the protocol. Defaults trigger the NPL auction, which assigns the debt to licensed U.S. collection agencies and routes any recovered principal and interest back to the pool, thereby safeguarding lender funds without requiring them to litigate. **Will you have an insurance fund?** * For the **Crypto Credit Lines** sleeve, yes. An insurance fund (equity tranche) sits ahead of the junior tranche as first-loss capital, so the order of loss absorption is insurance fund → sUSD3 (junior) → USD3 (senior). 3Jane has deployed $1m of equity capital here, and as the amount on credit scales the implied leverage scales up. * This insurance fund backstops the crypto credit lines only — it does **not** apply to the Fintech Credit Conduits. Each FCC facility carries its own credit enhancement (originator first-loss equity, overcollateralization, reserves, and performance triggers), with sUSD3 subordination protecting USD3 across both sleeves at the capital-stack level. ### Fintech Credit Conduits **What are 3Jane's two credit sleeves?** * **Crypto Credit Lines (CCL):** uncollateralized USDC credit lines 3Jane originates directly to cryptonatives. * **Fintech Credit Conduits (FCC):** funding 3Jane provides to other U.S. fintech lenders via warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flow purchases. Both sleeves are funded by the same USD3 / sUSD3 stack. **What is the difference between a warehouse loan and a forward-flow?** * A **warehouse** is a revolving credit line advanced against a lender's pooled receivables held in an SPV; 3Jane is the senior secured lender and the originator keeps a first-loss equity slice. * A **forward-flow** is an outright whole-loan purchase of eligible receivables into a buyer SPV on a true-sale basis. See [Warehouse Loans & Forward-Flows](/backing/fcc/warehouse-and-forward-flows). **Are USD3 / sUSD3 holders exposed to the fintech lenders themselves?** * No. Each facility funds a bankruptcy-remote SPV, so exposure is to thousands of the underlying obligors (consumers and small businesses), not to the originator's corporate credit. An originator bankruptcy does not sweep the collateral. **Where does FCC yield come from?** * FCCs are contractual-cash-flow lending: the position is paid from thousands of specific obligations between named end-borrowers — small businesses and consumers — ring-fenced inside an SPV. Yield is the spread between what those borrowers pay on short-duration credit and what it costs to fund them through structured liabilities, net of the originator's servicing economics and expected losses. That residual spread flows into the facility and splits across USD3 (senior) and sUSD3 (junior). See [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution). **What protects USD3 in an FCC facility?** * Layered credit enhancement: pool excess spread, originator first-loss equity, overcollateralization, reserves, performance triggers, and sUSD3 subordination. See [Credit Enhancement & Loss Distribution](/backing/fcc/credit-enhancement-and-loss-distribution). **Who handles the dollars?** * 3Jane runs the USD leg — offramp, disbursement, collection, onramp — through [Erebor](/backing/fcc/banking-rail-erebor), a nationally chartered U.S. bank. **What personally identifiable information is stored?** * Read [Privacy & Storage](/backing/ccl/privacy-and-storage). **Do any 3rd parties have access to personally identifiable information?** * Only collections agencies have access to personally identifiable information in the case of a default. No other party has visibility into the data, including the Ethereum ledger, Reclaim, Cred protocol, Blockchain Bureau, and others. **Do I need to install anything on my phone for Reclaim to work?** * No, we use IOS appclips. **Connecting to Credit Karma does not work.** * Go off vpn. # Glossary Terms used across 3Jane's two credit sleeves and the USD3 / sUSD3 capital stack. ## Capital stack * **USD3** — the senior tranche; a credit-enhanced, yield-bearing ERC-4626 token minted by depositing USDC. Earns a variable senior share of pool yield and is protected by sUSD3 subordination and other credit enhancement. * **sUSD3** — the junior tranche; staked from USD3. Earns the levered junior share of pool yield and absorbs first losses (net recoveries) ahead of USD3. Subject to a lock period. * **Tranche** — a layer of the capital structure with a defined claim priority. Senior is paid first and takes losses last; junior is paid last and takes losses first. * **Tranche ratio** (`TRANCHE_RATIO`) — the maximum share of debt that can be subordinated to sUSD3 (e.g. 15% junior cap; the senior is the remainder). Also caps sUSD3 supply. * **Tranche share variant** (`TRANCHE_SHARE_VARIANT`) — the fixed fraction of pool interest paid to the junior tranche; the senior receives the remainder. Both tranche rates float with pool yield (see [Pool Interest Rates](/usd3-susd3/pool-interest-rates)). * **Waterfall** — the order in which losses are absorbed (junior first, senior last) and principal is repaid; interest is split between the tranches by the tranche share variant. * **Excess spread** — net yield a pool generates over its life before any principal is impaired; the first layer of loss absorption. * **TVV (Total Value Verified)** — every verifiable dollar standing behind the pool's deployed credit. ## Sleeves * **CCL (Crypto Credit Lines)** — 3Jane's direct sleeve: uncollateralized USDC credit lines underwritten to cryptonatives and held by 3Jane. * **FCC (Fintech Credit Conduits)** — 3Jane's conduit sleeve: funding provided to other fintech lenders via warehouse loans, participations, and forward-flows. ## Crypto Credit Lines * **3CA (3Jane Credit Algorithm)** — the offchain underwriting algorithm that sets a credit line's size, default-risk premium, and repayment rate. * **Jane Score** — a composite of onchain and offchain creditworthiness (Cred Protocol, Blockchain Bureau, VantageScore 3.0). * **DRP (Default-Risk Premium)** — the per-borrower rate added on top of the base money-market rate. * **MCA (Merchant Cash Advance)** — the legal structure for a CCL credit line: a purchase of future receivables that establishes recourse under U.S. law. * **Merchant** — a CCL borrower. ## Fintech Credit Conduits * **Originator** — the fintech lender 3Jane funds; it acquires, underwrites, and services the end-borrowers. * **Warehouse loan** — a revolving credit line advanced against a pledged pool of receivables in an SPV; 3Jane is the senior secured lender. * **Forward-flow** — an outright whole-loan purchase of eligible receivables on a forward calendar (true-sale). * **Participation** — a purchased interest in a pool of receivables or a facility. * **SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle)** — a bankruptcy-remote entity that holds the receivables, insulated from the originator and from 3Jane's sponsor. * **Bankruptcy-remote** — structured so a counterparty's bankruptcy cannot sweep the collateral. * **Advance rate** — the percentage of the eligible borrowing base 3Jane lends against (e.g. 75%). * **Overcollateralization (OC)** — the cushion by which eligible collateral exceeds the drawn balance; tested on a schedule. * **First-loss equity** — the originator's own capital that absorbs losses before 3Jane's position. * **DACA (Deposit Account Control Agreement)** — a tri-party agreement giving 3Jane control of the collection account. * **True-sale** — a transfer where beneficial ownership of the loans passes to the buyer SPV. * **Servicer / backup servicer** — the party that collects payments; a backup stands ready if the primary fails. * **Coupon** — the interest rate paid to the facility / noteholder. * **WAL (Weighted-Average Life)** — the average time to receive principal across the pool. * **DPD (Days Past Due)** — delinquency measured in days since a missed payment. * **Charge-off** — principal written off as uncollectible; cumulative charge-offs measure realized loss. * **Vintage** — a cohort of loans grouped by origination period, tracked for performance. * **Revolving period** — the phase during which principal collections are recycled into new advances or purchases. * **Amortization** — the wind-down phase: advances stop and collections pay down the senior balance. * **Staging** — capital off-ramped to cash but not yet wired into a facility. * **Complexity premium** — the portion of a borrower's rate that compensates for speed and access rather than credit risk. # Integrations 1. [Reclaim Protocol](https://www.reclaimprotocol.org/) - on-chain proofs of offchain api responses for underwriting 2. [Cred Protocol](https://www.credprotocol.com/) - credit scoring modelling of onchain addresses 3. [Blockchain Bureau](https://blockchainbureau.com/) - credit scoring modelling of onchain addresses 4. [EigenLayer](https://www.eigenlayer.xyz/) - cryptoeconomic security of offchain zkTLS proofs 5. [Plaid](https://plaid.com/) - banking API 6. [Credit Karma](https://www.creditkarma.com/) - VantageScore 3.0 credit scores and credit metadata across TransUnion and Equifax credit reports 7. [Block Analitica](https://x.com/BlockAnalitica) - model yield opportunities, whitelist prime assets for underwriting, propose optimal LTVs ## **DeFi integrations** As we expand and whitelist more [assets](/backing/ccl/credit-underwriter/assets) 3Jane users will see their usable credit line grow. This is beneficial for the whitelisted projects, for 3Jane and the users for both parties.
If you think your DeFi project would be a good fit for whitelisting or have other collaboration ideas, please reach out to Uh via telegram: [@uhr3al](https://t.me/uhr3al). # Links 1. Whitepaper: 2. Website: 3. Twitter: 4. Discord: 5. Telegram payment broadcasts channel: 6. Terms and Conditions: 7. Privacy Policy: 8. Disclaimers: 9. Mirror: 10. DeFi Advance Legal Agreements: 1. v1: 2. v0: Study 1. Ethereum is game-changing technology, literally. 2. A model of trust building with anonymous re-matching. [https://www.sciencedirect.com/\ science/article/abs/pii/S0167268118303299](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268118303299) 3. Social collateral, soft information and online peer-to-peer lending. # Audits | Auditor | Date | Link | | -------------------- | ------------------ | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Veridise | August 18th, 2025 | [veridise-audit](https://github.com/3jane-protocol/audits/blob/main/veridise-audit.pdf) | | Sherlock | August 20th, 2025 | [sherlock-audit](https://github.com/3jane-protocol/audits/blob/main/sherlock-audit.pdf) | | Electisec | October 18th, 2025 | [electisec-audit](https://github.com/3jane-protocol/audits/blob/main/electisec-audit.pdf) | | Sherlock Competition | October 18th, 2025 | [sherlock-2-audit](https://github.com/3jane-protocol/audits/blob/main/sherlock-2-audit.pdf) | | Electisec | May 26th, 2026 | [electisec-audit](https://github.com/3jane-protocol/audits/blob/main/yaudit-usd3-susd3-may-2026-audit.pdf) |